Bhoomi and the political economy of land
Peri-urban Bangalore, Karnataka


Information and Communications Technologies for Development:

Comparative Analysis of Impacts and Costs from India

A report for a project funded by

The Department of Information Technology (DIT)

Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Government of India

(vide administrative approval no.3(74)/2003-EGD, dated 10.02.2004)

and

Infosys Technologies, Bangalore

-----------------


Bhoomi and the political economy of land

Peri-urban Bangalore, Karnataka



Project contact: Rajeev Chawla IAS

Secretary (e-Governance) and Special Secretary (Bhoomi)

Government of Karnataka

secyegov-dpar@karnataka.gov.in





Summary



The Bhoomi program to digitize 20 million land records has involved technical design, management practices, and dedicated expertise of a caliber rare in public bureaucracies. The project is considered a ‘best practice’ model to be replicated in other parts of India and elsewhere. This study examines the program in 6 taluks in Bangalore rural districts where mega-development projects and agro businesses requiring large tracts of land are attracting affluent investors. In the context of such active land markets, the study suggests that computerization and the centralization of land records has made it more expensive and less efficient for poorer groups to access and use land records. The centralization of land management that has willy-nilly accompanied the computerization process also seems to reinforce economic and political processes whereby larger and medium and a variety of non-local groups benefit at the cost of smaller users of land. The study points to how, when e-governance projects with noble intentions, backed by excellent technical capabilities and committed implementation, intervene in land issues, the political economy of land markets, in addition to the techno-managerial features of the project, can shape outcomes. By raising the societal aspects of e-governance, and highlighting the need to complement technocratic concepts like ‘transparency’, ‘efficiency’, ‘governance’, and ‘best practice’ with terms that reflect the uneven terrain of power and control that governance embodies, this study contributes to the evolving debate on how policy makers can continue to improve and replicate projects such as Bhoomi.



The significance and context of Bhoomi

8.1 The Bhoomi program to computerize land titles in the state of Karnataka has been underway since February 2001. After its initial launch in five taluks as a pilot program, the Government of Karnataka (GoK) extended it in two phases to cover all 177 taluks in the state, so as to ensure mainstreaming within broader land management. The program has generated a computerized database of 20 million land records belonging to 6.7 million farmers, besides gathering the entire history of cropping pattern of the last 12 seasons.[1] In no other poor country are land cadastrals being digitized on such a scale.[2] Framing the program has demanded technical expertise, and implementing it required very committed managerial expertise. Not surprisingly, Bhoomi has won several awards, and was presented as an example of ‘best practice’ by the World Bank – leading to the program being showcased nationally and internationally.



8.2 Bhoomi is also distinctive for other reasons. First, it intervenes in land issues that underpin some of the core issues of economy and politics; second, as ‘IT’ it confronts development issues directly in that it shapes and is shaped by government practices at various


levels. Further, as the interface for land issues that affect people in a most fundamental sense, Bhoomi is in many ways the most public part of the government.[3]



8.3 Bhoomi is not only distinctive, but is representative of the view among many mainstream development economists, especially of the World Bank, that traditional land management practices often impede economic development and poverty alleviation.[4] They view such practices as vestiges of under-development, characterized by the lack of transparency and centered in corrupt patronage politics that exploit the poor. When programs like e-governance fail, blame is laid on politics – separating managerial expertise from political will.[5]



8.4 Thus, reorganizing traditional practices to promote efficient land markets is seen as a means of improving the trade and investment climate. It is also seen as a means of delivering the benefits of globalization by drawing capital to spur rural markets and agro-business, including those businesses based on new biotechnologies, so as to raise productivity and reduce poverty. Thus, it is not surprising that systemizing land cadastrals via its computerization forms a core initiative for a ‘reforming’ economy and is actively promoted by organizations like the World Bank. In more specific terms, the rationale for the program rests on two inter-related developmental objectives – to promote efficiency and transparency.



8.5 In the language of mainstream development economists, Bhoomi’s promotion of ‘efficiency’ is meant to streamline land administration by reducing the time to access land records and the procedures of title related administration. In terms of ‘transparency’, the major argument for Bhoomi relates to reducing the exploitation of small farmers by the corruption promoted by large farmers and middlemen. This goal is linked to the management of land at the village level where the argument is that local officials use ambiguous records and ‘manual’ systems of recording to benefit the local elite.[6] Such a view is also evident in the comment of the principal designer of the Bhoomi, who writes that: “…One would appreciate that a system like Bhoomi actually snatches power from panchayat members...”[7]



8.6 Another reason, perhaps less explicit, is that senior bureaucrats at the state level found themselves disconnected from land related management that was dominated by local level officials.[8] This disconnect might explain important aspects of the program: it centralizes land records to the taluk level, and makes illegal the continuation of old paper and village-based Record of Rights, Crops and Tenancy (RTC) formats in transactions after 2001. In the words of the senior technical officer, “….(U)nless the ‘old system was killed’ the new program would never succeed.”[9]



8.7 The commercial objectives of the program are to open up the rural and agro market by increasing the clarity of land ownership, and by providing relatively more homogenous and consistent tenure recording, to attract investments, and to make data on cropping patterns and type of lands commercially available.[10] The sale of land records is also aimed at cost recovery and to improve the prospects of sustainability of the Bhoomi project itself.[11]



8.8 The view of land implicit in Bhoomi is not without its critics: it is contested by scholars who point to the central importance of social and political categories in helping to get beyond a functional and technocratic understanding.[12] Analyzing the political economy of land, they argue, is important to raise social and political questions that move beyond the managerial-functional approach inherent in some assessments of Bhoomi.[13] This report explores Bhoomi from a larger developmental perspective and examines some of its programmatic claims through an intensive study of the project’s functioning in six taluks in Bangalore rural district.[14]


History
8.9 The Bhoomi program is the third attempt at computerizing land records in Karnataka. The Government of India (GoI) conceived the computerizing of land records as a countrywide program in 1991 and Karnataka was among the first states to initiate action.[15] The support it had is reflected in the national funding for the program by the BJP-led coalition government despite the main opposition party, the Congress, being in power in the state.[16] The project cost about Rs. 20 crores, which was financed by the Ministry of Rural Development of the GOI, with a nearly equal contribution by the Revenue Department, GoK.



8.10 In the state, Bhoomi had the active support of the then Chief Minister, who inaugurated the first kiosk in Maddur, his home constituency. His support was critical in pushing the program through the administration.[17] The technically challenging program of ‘marrying’ software to complex, and often local systems, of land management, was driven by the dynamic leadership of senior bureaucrats in the Revenue Department with the technical assistance of the NIC.[18]

8.11 It is unclear if, before launching Bhoomi, studies were undertaken on the diverse land management practices within the five main governance systems of the state,[19] or on the economic, social and political consequences of homogenizing forms of reporting.[20] In any case, the Revenue Department organized extensive training sessions to launch the program across the state. Trainees included the sons of the previous Revenue Inspectors (RIs) and Village Accountants (VAs). An elaborate system of control was developed at various levels of the bureaucracy to ensure compliance, and technical consultants were used to operate the software developed by the NIC at the taluk-level kiosks located within the office of the tahsildar.



Current features of the program

8.12 Bhoomi places the RTC in a digital format. With eleven columns, spread among nine categories of information, including the characteristics of the land, the types of soil, and the crops grown, the RTC is vital for a landowner to access bank loans, to buy seeds and fertilizer, for issuance of documents like the Small Farmer Certificates, and also for evidence in court – although Bhoomi records have only presumptive value. The RTC also records when land is subdivided or amalgamated, and such ‘mutations’[21] as part of land ownership/tenancy and inheritance. A planned improvement is the ‘Bhoomi Plus’ – where the survey or physical dimension records will also be microfiched and placed online.

8.13 The computerization is based on a LAN interconnecting a kiosk and a back office within each taluk office. There is also a proposal, not implemented at the time of this study, to connect all taluk offices, so as to centralize the data at a server in the Central Treasury of Karnataka. Over time, the original software has been improved by providing various features to try to reduce corruption, including: a) First in - First Out (FIFO)[22]; biometrics; and, c) double screen for users to view typed in matter, including touch screens. In all, Bhoomi replaced the manual writing and maintenance of land records and centralized land data in 177 taluk-based kiosks, now the only legally valid locations for obtaining land records in the state.


Field level insights and the societal context of Bhoomi[23]
8.14 Fieldwork was undertaken in six of the eight taluks in the Bangalore rural district i.e. the areas immediately surrounding the rapidly growing urban area. Within these, seventy-five intensive interviews conducted in seven villages. Two broad categories of taluks were selected, to compare those that are economically ‘depressed’ with those that are ‘development hot spots’.[24] Table 8.1 lists the various types of taluks. Initially, we studied four taluks, one in the northwest that is rural in character and economically depressed, and three in the east and southeast, that are peri-urban in nature and ‘hot spots’. Village level studies are drawn from these four taluks.



8.15 In the depressed taluks to the west and northwest of Bangalore, 30% of the village population is landless. This percentage was probably higher in previous times because, over the years, many have migrated to Bangalore in search of work after being pushed out by the poor quality of land and limited access to irrigation facilities. Of the total land in these taluks, 70% is dry, 20% is kharab/gowmal land, and 10% is wetland. Most farming is for low-value crops like ragi and pigeon pea. Of the landed population, half are small and marginal farmers, owning between 1 and 5 acres, with the SC/ST population owning between 1 and 3 acres. Of the other half, 5% are large farmers who own more than 10 acres, and 45% are medium farmers owning between 5 and10 acres. In terms of caste groupings, the SC/STs form 60% of the population. Other landowners include the Lingayats and the Vokalligas, besides Muslims and Christians (who are SC converts). Most of the landless belong to the ‘Bhovi’ community. The larger farmers own almost all the wetland and a significant proportion of the ‘dry land’ too. Thus, land is mostly with small and medium farmers who have relatively small rain-fed parcels.



8.16 In the villages of the taluks to the east and the southeast, there is a higher incidence of wetland, at 20% of the total land. The cultivation of high-value crops including sugarcane, paddy, vegetables and roses is widespread. There is a higher proportion of large and medium farmers, mostly belonging to the Vokalliga community. The landless population is about 30% of the total, again reflecting the possibility of migration to Bangalore. The SC/ST and non-Vokalliga communities own equal amounts of dry land and are mostly small farmers. Another difference between these taluks and the ones in the west and the south is the extensive use of electricity and diesel pump sets, and the relatively better bus connectivity. A third difference is the large number of brick factories and chicken hatcheries.



8.17 Since the initial findings raised issues with the program and contradicted what previous studies and comments had viewed as an unqualified success, two additional taluks were visited. But, here too, field studies reinforced the initial findings. These additional two taluks are mainly rural. One of them is known for high quality land and high value horticulture. The other taluk is similar to the ones in the northwest – depressed, except for one part where a multi-national corporation has set up an auto-manufacturing plant. Thus, the fieldwork compares rural taluks with those facing intensive growth as Bangalore’s periphery develops, allowing the investigation of a range of development pressures. In addition to the kiosks, the team visited the villages to meet actors, including small farmers, the landless, and members of the village panchayat. The emphasis in the fieldwork was to understand local history and society, the nature and type of land and its distribution, the characteristics of social groups, and to understand pre- and post-Bhoomi processes. The goal was to understand Bhoomi not only within a specific technical frame but also with respect to how it’s stated objectives fit into a larger developmental context.



8.18 Efficiency and transparency: The most vocal complaint of our respondents had to do with the increased delays that have resulted after the launch of Bhoomi. Before Bhoomi, we were told, obtaining a copy of an RTC, or a mutation, took 2-3 days. These documents were made available at the village level via the VA and, as one small farmer put it, the work could be ‘fast and efficient’, at least in an emergency.[25] After Bhoomi, all categories of landowners said that any significant change like a mutation takes 3-4 months. This delay may be related to the dependence of the farmers on agents or intermediaries. Often, if farmers visit the taluk office they lose their day’s work, and they may find that either the computer is down or that there is a power cut.[26]



8.19 Another common complaint is of complications arising due to wrongly spelled names or the incorrect entry of survey numbers or measurement into the computer. Rectification involves a process similar to a ‘khata change’[27] and may require multiple visits to the taluk and extra bribes to be ‘followed up’. Thus, more than just one visit is often required after an application is submitted, reinforcing the role of agents undertaking the job for a price.[28] A more serious issue raised by smaller farmers was that the centralization and computerization of records had allowed their survey numbers to be more easily used by large and middle level farmers to access government schemes and benefits like subsidies for the ‘small farmer’, seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, and plants.[29]

8.20 Most respondents, especially small and medium farmers, mentioned that bribes had increased after the launch of Bhoomi. This increase appears to have occurred despite the implementation of ‘preventive’ measures such as FIFO. Many of the more experienced respondents linked the increased corruption and time taken to the de facto centralization of functions to the taluk level following the centralization of data. Their view was that while bribes had to be paid even in the pre-Bhoomi situation, it was limited to the VA and the RI. Some even justified this payment and argued that it was the VA and RI who helped them understand complex land procedures. More important, before the Bhoomi program, ‘pressure’ could be applied on the local officials at the village level to act. At the taluk level, however, this is harder as the process involves four administrative layers, or ‘tables’ as they termed it: the VA, the RI, the siresdhar, and the tahsildar/computer centre. Also, in the pre-Bhoomi situation, bribes were locally negotiated and usually affordable, and these were typically differentiated by large and small farmers and linked to complex obligatory relationships in the village. In the post-Bhoomi period, as we discuss later, the process is dominated by a network and system of various ‘agents’ who have set a ‘market rate’, and systematized bribing to make it all pervasive, especially in taluks experiencing rapid development.



8.21 Table 8.1 shows the variations in bribe amounts and time taken and sets them within a larger process. The bribery or ‘agent’ rates in the less intensively developing areas are on a transaction basis whereas they are on an acre basis in areas undergoing intensive development. However, many officials at the lower level, including the ‘recipients’ of bribes, angrily mentioned how higher level officials ‘pressurize’ them, and emphasize how much of the ‘higher level’ bribery was facilitated and brushed under the carpet. In contrast, respondents mentioned that in some development ‘hot spots’, the local land market is so extensively captured by an elite that they had instituted pressure to ensure ‘zero’ bribery. In another case, the interests behind a land mutation process were so powerful that the entire process took under an hour – despite the specified time limits for ‘public display and information’.[30]



8.22 The reader can well understand that such information is highly sensitive. Most respondents requested anonymity. For this reason, we have provided the broad categories of being more/less intensively developed taluks instead of identifying them. The intention is not to make a specific correlation between the types of bribes, land quality, the type of development activity and senior administrative or political actors. It is merely to show that corruption has increased and efficiency lost for the most members of the public, reflecting the power relationships that land markets closely embody. Overall, for example, one ex-panchayat president argues that poorer people are now discouraged from applying for copies of their titles due to the increased bribes, uncertainty, and time taken.



8.23 Promoting agro and rural markets: The team did not explore the issue of how Bhoomi records help agro-business, although the press reference in Footnote 126 suggests a growing interest in this. This is, however, controversial and there is a large literature on the threats posed by agro-business to small and marginal farmers, as well as to natural eco systems.[31] There are also problems with data quality wherein what is recorded as land use in the RTC may not correspond to the situation on the ground situation.[32]



Table 8.1: Whose “Transparency and Efficiency”?


Taluks / Villages / Respondents
Pre- Bhoomi Post Bhoomi Other details
RTC (copy/correction)
Mutation
RTC (copy/correction)
Mutation or khata change

Locations:

3 Villages in a relatively less intensively urbanizing taluk.

Respondents:

Local politicians: 3 (current and former
Village Presidents)
Taluk and village level officials: 4

(RI: 1, VAs: 3)

Small farmers: 10

Brokers: 2
Rs.5 to Rs.100

Immediate
Rs.1000

2-4 days
Rs.15 + Rs.35 plus expenses of Rs.100 for agent to visit the taluk office

Time taken is 2-3 months


Rs.3000 in addition to transport expenses for several visits. While there is an official one-month rule, in reality this normally extends to 3-4 months.
Bribes are on a transaction basis

Locations:

2 villages in an urbanized taluk in the city’s peri-urban area

Respondents
Taluk and village officials: 5

Politicians: 5

Small and medium farmers: 10

Brokers
Rs.3 to Rs.50

Immediate
Rs.500 to Rs.5000

2-4 days
Rs 15 (individual) and Rs. 100 processed via an agent.

Correction for individual is not possible due to the need to visit the office for 10 days. Application via an agent is Rs.300.
Rs.3000 to Rs.5000

If there is a problem, the amount can go upto Rs. 15,000 to Rs.20,000
Bribes on an acre basis
Investors from Andhra Pradesh, and large developers and layouts catering to NRIs and IT firms, dominate the land market.







Location:

2 villages in an urbanized and in some parts, very rapidly urbanizing taluk in the city’s peri-urban area.

Respondents
Local politician: 1

(former Gram Panchayat member)

Local (and former) officials: 4

(RI: 1, VAs: 2, Siresdhar: 1)

Small and medium farmers: 6

Brokers: 3


Time limit = 1 or 2 days

Cost Rs.5 to Rs.50

Fewer corrections were required in the manual system. In those cases, a correction could be made immediately if needed.

Previously, the medium farmers used to give grain or vegetables instead of a ‘charge’ for RTC issue. Normally Rs.3 was collected, Rs.2 for the Court fee, and Rs.1 for the stamp. The remaining amount depended on relationship but the maximum was Rs.100. 60% of the applicants used fall in the Rs.3 category since they were small farmers seeking government benefits. The remaining 40% were people who take an RTC to get bank loans, tractors or power looms (to tap 5 hp power, 15 hp for power looms). Brick factories and poultry farms need a RTC as a certificate to get subsidies associated with these schemes. The subsidies are based on whether the farmer is small/medium/large, which the secretary could manipulate.
Rs.500 to Rs. 5000 depending on the size of land and the complexity of khata involved. Following are categories of land sanctions:



Government sanctions the person gomala land or lifts the pada. These require more documentation, and increase the bribe amount. This also includes the documentation needed to obtain a sale deed and pouthi khata (inherited land). It also relates to the issuance of ‘death certificates’ or other complexities like those for a mortgage release, give and exchange deed, will deed, and court order.
The fees depend on the type of work and the reality of visiting the taluk office. Copy of RTC: Rs.15 (fee) and a bus ticket of Rs.40. There is the additional problem of equipment downtime at the kiosk, which means that, often, a day is not enough to finish one’s work. Respondents also mentioned problems with the computer system.



Interestingly, some mentioned that, if a single person comes with one request, there is no bribe. But if an agent applies, then the bribe money comes in, as he is likely to have more than one application. However, most poor farmers cannot afford to lose a day’s employment and are forced to employ an agent on their behalf. The total cost for a issue of RTC amounts to Rs.300 if undertaken by the farmers themselves. It is an additional Rs.100 if via an agent.




The bribe ranges between Rs. 1000 and Rs.3000. Here, the lower amount is for those seen as ‘small farmers’ with no significant problems. But having land with no ‘problem’ is rare, as most small farmers are situated on land with some legal issue to it. For instance, many may not have Form 79-AB that states their ‘agriculturist status’. This is however an issue as there are many ‘duplicate’ certificates.



Others are in a situation where some part of their land is ‘officially’ un-cultivable or kharab. However, such kharab land is often brought into productive use over time, whereas the official records still show these as being un-cultivable. Some of these recording changes, like that of road side land being now made cultivable, involve fewer procedures and the bribe amount is about Rs. 3000. In other cases, like the accounting for common ‘threshing’ land in joint family holdings, the bribe can rise up to Rs. 20,000.



There are also other relatively minor types of mistakes, like a mismatch in measurement, or a mismatch in the names of a joint family in the records. Earlier, such problems were taken care of by the VA over-writing the RTC. Since the process was undertaken locally, people could find out if it was intended as a fraud.

The time taken for such changes is between one to three months.
Bribes on an acre basis
Location:

Kiosk in city.

An outlying area of the southern part of the city that was occupied mostly by small farmers and the poor. In 1995, the real estate market changed rapidly to attract higher income groups.



Respondents:

Local officials

(serving and former) from various departments

Small farmers: 2 Brokers (group discussion)

Kiosk consultant
Rs.10 to Rs.15 for RTC correction
Mutation cost Rs.3000 to Rs.10,000, reflecting the rate after the 1995 – 2000 real estate boom.
Rs.1000 to Rs.5000

The charges, including bribes, reflect the current real estate market. 3 months processing time
Rs. 20,000 to Rs.100,000 and takes 1 to 3 months
On a square foot basis.

Since city property rates are very high, transactions are conducted on a square foot basis.



One respondent mentioned that, in addition to bribes, one needs administrative and political pressure to get the system to move. In his own case, despite being ‘educated’, and being in the government with contacts, the lack of ‘co-ordination’ between the RI and the VA, on the sharing of the Rs. 6000 bribe, meant that he was not able to get his work done.

Location:

A taluk known for high value horticulture. Four sub areas in two broad categories:



Area 1, 2: High value agriculture



Area 3, 4 -- high-value real estate market as land is being developed for industries and for apartments for NRIs and employees of IT firms. Land acquisition by the KIADB has also increased prices.



Respondents
Politician/farmer: 1

Local (including former) officials: 2

(RI: 1, Sireshdar: 1)

Small farmers: 7

Advocate: 1

Consultants: 2

Brokers: 2
Time limit = 1 or 2 days

Cost was between Rs.5 and Rs.50.



Fewer corrections were required in the manual system, and if required, this was immediately corrected. Overwriting in the old system did not necessarily represent tampering.




The charges for mutation ranged between Rs. 500 and Rs.1000, depending on economic status of the applicant. The time taken was usually a maximum of one week. For influential groups, this could be done in one or two days.

During the 1990s, the real estate market changed in all the areas: Areas 1 and 2 moved into high-value horticulture, and Areas 3 and 4 into IT and high-value industries. Mutation used to then cost between Rs.5000 and Rs.10,000
Copy of an RTC without any correction is Rs.15. However, most small and medium farmers, who typically require some correction, have to pay between Rs.500 and Rs.600. These applicants are a very small group, since the large and well-connected groups have already captured the land market.
There are two types of khata rates. For locals, the bribe ranges between Rs. 1000 and Rs.2000. For ‘outsiders’, it ranges between Rs.6000 and Rs.7000.


On an acre basis
Landowners of the Reddy community have invested in Area 2. In Areas 3 and 4, the IT/NRI area, a khata change for even a small 30’x40’ plot can require a bribe of Rs.6000.



This taluk is supposed to have kiosks decentralized to the ‘Hobli /circle’ (group of villages) level and operated by private parties. This kiosk was not functional at the time of the field visit. On the 26 July 2004, a local organization protested for a ‘Hobli’ level kiosk. As this protest did not result in any action, another protest was planned for the end of August 2004 including locking the taluk level Bhoomi office.

Location:

A western taluk with heterogeneous land markets.



Area 1was like any other ‘depressed’ part of a taluk in western Bangalore. But, after 1995, land values spiraled with the announcement of a mega-development project.



Other three areas (Areas 2, 3 and 4) of this taluk still remain relatively ‘depressed’.



Respondents:

Local politician: 1

(Party president)

Local officials: 2

(RI: 1, VA: 1)

Small farmers: 2

Advocate: 1
Rs.50 to Rs.100 for an RTC change; immediately undertaken.



Rs.5 to Rs.10 for a copy of an RTC.
Expenses incurred for a mutation ranged between Rs.500 and Rs.1000
There are relatively few applications for an RTC copy. This is because the land market is re-structured in favor of larger players.

Also, between 30 to 40% of the total land holdings were acquired by KIADB. Of the remainder, lands of the smaller farmers of the SC/ST community were appropriated by the larger Vokalligas, most of whom have between 50 to 100 acres.



In Area 1, since the landowners are from the political and administrative elite, there are no bribes.

Due to the ‘pressure’ generated from the top, the processing time is also less than the stipulated period.



In Areas 2, 3 and 4, the rates are the same as in the preceding category. A copy of an RTC costs Rs. 15, plus Rs.100 for agent expenses.

For corrections in RTC, the amount is between Rs. 500 and Rs. 1000. Time taken in these areas is usually between 3 and 6 months, but depends on political influence. If the applicant goes through a councilor, or a panchayat head, a correction will happen within 3 months. Without connections, it can take up to two years.






The bribes for mutation, as in the case of the RTC, depend on the ‘entry’ point in the administrative system. If the applicant is a local farmer who approaches via the VA or RI, the bribe amount is Rs.10,000. If the applicant is an ‘ordinary’ person but approaching via relatively higher administrative circuits such as the AC/Thasildar, the bribe can vary between Rs. 50,000 and Rs.100,000. The routing of the bribe in the case of the higher-level administrative circuit is not ‘visible’ as it is clubbed with the ‘lawyers’’ fee. The lawyer’s fees are also charged on an acre basis, which includes the bribe into the system.
In Area 1, buyers and landowners are MLAs and MPs. The agents are few, but exclusive and well connected. There is a key role also played by senior administrative officers. Bribes are on a transaction basis.



Most applicants ignore the mandatory waiting period. Applications are pre-dated and, in special cases, can be processed in less than an hour. Other corporate players investing in mega projects get land allocated by the state using institutions like the KIADB. The bribery system that exists is internalized with that process.



In areas 2,3,4 where base survey maps are not available with the Taluk level office of the Revenue department, a request for mutation change is sent to the Survey department, which maintains records at the hobli, taluk and district level. The applicant has to follow up the papers in the Survey department – sometimes involving several visits to three levels. Bribes at the Survey department are relatively higher than the Revenue department and depend on the type of correction. If it involves correction of measurement, survey number or change of name, relatively higher bribes have to be paid.
















The societal context of Bhoomi

8.24 Three points - transparency, efficiency, and the promotion of agro-business - underlie the functional perspective closely linked to the World Bank’s World Development Report and the De Soto book referenced in Footnote 129. But to understand Bhoomi, like any ‘best practice’ project, using only this logic is to be boxed into a techno-managerial approach that emphasizes monetary value to the exclusion of more social and political issues. It is to miss the structural issues of power and the way possession and dispossession happens.[33] In analyzing Bhoomi as an e-governance initiative, there is a need to address the politics behind ‘governance’, rather than just the ‘e’. Doing full justice to such a task is beyond the scope of this report, but the following comments will outline some of the conceptual terrain and the key issues as they pertain to Bhoomi.



8.25 Considering that land is unlike other commodities or resources, it is important to understand a larger political dynamic: the types of players, the way land is consolidated and alienated, the use of political and bureaucratic connections, and the history or ‘timeline’ when particular interventions are made. It is also critical to understand how the use and exchange value of land is historically defined and shaped by ‘law in process’; land is bound by an ever-changing bundle of competing claims on it (rather than ‘rights’). Many of these claims are built from the ground up by social conventions. Thus, the ‘grayness’ that surrounds titles and tenure forms may not have to do with simply ‘bad records’. For instance, the ‘over writing’ that the Revenue department shows as illustrations of ‘corruption in the pre-Bhoomi situation must be examined in its societal context. Such ‘over-writing’ could well represent ‘flexibility and responsiveness’ whereby poorer farmers are able to pressure the VA to modify mistakes in records – which today is done via computers. In many ways, these processes reflect the power relationships that configure the interests of one group versus another.



8.26 In land transactions, various legal-institutional structures shape local reality: the Indian Constitution and its overarching legal-institutional structures, Government Orders and their bindings on line agencies and local administration, interventions by panchayats, and also, customary institutions that still influence the functioning of the Gram Panchayats (GPs) and their politics.[34] Just as the claims over land are built from the ground up and are linked to the settlement of people, they are also shaped by an institutional politics where local groups may find their claims dissolved and become victims of a new politics. For instance, despite being settled for decades and cultivating land, many farmers can find their land “notified” for acquisition with only a few among them, with relatively more stable claims, having a possibility of compensation. If so, it is the politics of law making and institutional action that shape claims over land.[35]



8.27 The preceding paragraphs suggest the need for an analysis that goes beyond technical and managerial issues. Table 8.1 suggests the need to look beyond the mechanics of computerization to focus on larger societal issues. It suggests that a key issue is how the Bhoomi program, like the centralization of land recording to the taluk level, fits into the political economies for peri-urban and rural land. Village-level fieldwork in contrasting taluks showed up several distinct land types, distinct local level political economies, and distinct and different ways in which local villagers and ‘outside players’ attempt to establish claims on land and seek a particular use from it. For example, land officially categorized as degraded was often occupied and in use by poorer groups. This mismatch between reporting what is actually on the ground and what is now centralized in the Bhoomi database dilutes the ability of the poor to influence the system in their favor.[36] When the power of one group to shape the system in its favor is lost or eroded, another group gains. Power does not disappear, but it shifts and is re-organized, and is reinforced elsewhere.[37]

8.28 In this study, we focused specifically on the land processes within which Bhoomi fits. Essentially, our main finding is that specialized agents come into play to influence the land market. This power play of interests can centre on staking use of inherited land, and to seek regularization of begar hukum land.[38] Some of these agents ‘target’ small farmers owning dry land by gaining access to survey numbers, or by locating those families where there are property conflicts.[39] Properties with complications arising from Bangalore’s Master Planning regulations, such as the green belt, fall into yet another process. Table 8.2 details five agent-based land processing types that we know of. Each of these processes happens via complex circuits of official and social decision-making and actions. Bhoomi is but one aspect of a larger process that is shaped by an intensive power dynamic, driven by high-level political and administrative players in many locations. It is misleading to assume that computers and well-designed software alone, or the rigorous training of support staff driven by a dynamic and honest project champion can adequately address such structural and political issues.



8.29 The views of several respondents in framing the five processes, and our analysis of the bribes and time taken in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 show that, since the late 1990s, large players have dominated the peripheral land markets, especially in the taluks to the south and the east of Bangalore. Such players are able to draw on their links to the judicial and administrative elite, often in the form of ‘partnerships’, to consolidate land holdings belonging to small and marginal farmers and to regularize titles in their favor. In light of these larger structural changes, the question of bribes or time taken fades into relative insignificance, and management efforts such as FIFO are hardly effective, as the Bhoomi kiosk, and its back office, do not present an obstacle to the consolidation of land. Likewise, given the ‘turn-key’ nature of processing carried out by skilled lawyers with administrative and political backing, a ‘technical fix’, or hardware and software updates, is unlikely to resolve the issue. On the contrary, our respondents mentioned that the relative ease with which information is now centrally available via the Bhoomi program merely facilitates the process. To the extent that information is available centrally, there is loss of information locally and the claiming process by small and marginal farmers is rendered less effective.[40] The five land development processes that field investigations revealed is presented here to provide a mix of those processes dominated by small players and those showing the extensive influence of larger ones.







Table 8.2: Bhoomi within a larger process of land transformation


Type of land/ process
Who owns such land? How is land transacted? Who are the interface agents? How do they interface with Bhoomi?
Land under pada
Small farmers with dry land.

A majority of SC/ST small farmers have pada imposed on their land but do not have the money (fines, backlog of taxes, bribes) to ‘lift’ it. These lands affect between 60% and 70% of the population.
Usually developers / real estate agent pre-finance the farmers title to pay the fines and lift the pada, but then appropriate it in their own name or in the name of their clients.
Two types of agents are involved – real estate agents selling land for farmhouses and those selling to small developers.
Agents come to Bhoomi kiosk for:

(a) Information on pada land; and

( Contacts with caseworkers to organize for ‘lifting’ the pada.



Computerization of records in such cases simplifies the work needed to get information.

Land with complications

- three examples

(A) Boundary problem

( Non partitioned land

© Property held by joint family
Small farmers. These lands are usually joint family holdings that have been subdivided over years.
Local agents purchase land from local farmers. Land may be partitioned but belong to a joint family. The agent contacts one member who is ‘conducive’ to influence, and towards parting with the documents and a sale. This ‘entry’ is then used to institute a legal process whereby the land is sold cheaply to the agent or his client.


Agents coordinate the entire process – at the sub-registrar’s office to the Bhoomi kiosk

All three complications come to the fore after land is sold and registered. The time from sub- registrar’s office to ‘entry’ in Bhoomi kiosk is important. The VA and RI play a role in issuing or stalling objections – which will automatically stop the titling process.



Depending on the ‘power relations’ among the different agents involved, the parties may seek a local resolution or go to the court. In the case of former, the agent mediates and links the parties to the village head. Usually the Shanbogh /VA with a knowledge of the land records of a particular village gets involved.
At the Bhoomi kiosk, the agents’ function is to expedite the change of records. This requires a ‘coordination’ with all four ‘tables’/actors involved in the process.



Computerization of records in such cases is accounted for as part of the entire cost of the entire land transaction process, but seen as a minor ‘maintenance’ issue.

Large tracts of land for large developers
Small and medium farmers.

Target is mainly dry land.
The majority of land holidings being small, this requires assembly and negotiation at the local level. Large developers operate at two levels – at the local level, via agents for assembly and negotiation with local farmers and at the district or taluk office for ‘regularization’.



A second aspect relates to the attempt to identify a ‘block’ of land that can be purchased for a bargain. Here, local agents target land in families with many claimants and where there is no agreement over the division of property.

Risk of failed transactions is borne by local agents.
Two types of circuits are

involved:

One, local or village level:

Developer ally with local

politicians (panchayat members), administrators at the Taluk level, or local real estate agent for:

· Assembly-negotiation with

individual farmers

· Risk of assembling



Second, depending on the complexity of land involved, developers ally with local politicians and senior administrators with influence at the taluk or district level for regularizing/updating land records at the taluk and at the panchayat level
Agents come to Bhoomi kiosk after building / consolidating and ‘cleaning up’ records at taluk or District office mainly for title registration. Agents and developers visit the Bhoomi kiosk during registration – to consolidate their claims.



Computerization of records in such cases is thus an insignificant part of the entire land transaction process.





Transaction of land within the Green Belt. Large developers target this type of land. Since a significant part of the Green Belt now abuts main roads, it is highly valued.
It is mainly small farmers who use such land for cultivation. In some cases, they have been allotted this land under various inam schemes but may have restrictions for sale.
The real estate agent has to perform the following functions:

(a) Assembly of several small land holidings

( Negotiation, and

© Conversion of land



.
Real estate agents entering into such transactions are economically and politically well-connected individuals (such as MLAs). The interfacing agents are the powerful interests and senior administrators. Due to legal complication involved in transacting such land, large developers often ally with politicians and senior administrators. Conversion of large tracts of green belt involves searching, locating family members and consolidating documents from different institutions.
The new buyers, i.e. urban economic agents, use Bhoomi to regularize the claim/title of the clients, mainly after obtaining NOC from the village panchayat. Because of the powerful interests and legal agents involved in the process, local institutions, such as the VA office or the Bhoomi kiosk, do not have much say.



Computerization of records in such cases is thus an insignificant part of the entire land transaction process.

Transaction of gomala land
Two types of alienation – one via market process and another via land acquisition.



Until now, small local agents dealt with the first type as users are not easily identifiable. In this case, agents obtain a General Power of Attorney (GPA) from landowners. Apparently a GPA is not shown in the Bhoomi RTC.



In the case of acquisition, governments target gomala land as it is legally less problematic and compensation is not an issue. Here it is important to note, that in present documentation, including Bhoomi, all public land including, private land under pada is registered as Sarkari land – hence making it easier to acquire. This issue is accentuated if customary forms of tenure are homogenized and then re-designated as ‘Sarkari’ land.
At present, and prior to Bhoomi, agents dealing with such land depend on the DC’s office for information on the targeted land and also about the amendments on the ownership of such land. Ownership of gomala land to individuals is done via an office order at the DC level. After Bhoomi, the process is facilitated by two things: easy access to information at the taluk level at one place and second, access to the DC’s office in case the order conferring claims is complex.
Local and non local agents at the

DC’s office.



In case of an acquisition, different state institutions interested in acquisition. Both private and state agencies have approached Bhoomi for information about land titles (ref. DH, dated 26th July). The Bangalore Development Authority has used this route in Kengeri to purchase information on land titles.
Land users/owners do not directly use the Bhoomi kiosk as the agents or the governments require access to information at one place making the transaction easier.

In the case of land acquired for projects, there might be second level transactions at the Bhoomi centre – but these are after the primary level data has been modified via the acquisition process.






The following two rows illustrate the constraints that small farmers face in using the Bhoomi kiosk. In particular, the main functions are the mutation and change of khata, and consolidating documents to avail various schemes. The table suggests how fertilizer and seed companies can use the information to locate farmers who could be potential consumers. If one knows a survey number, which most large farmers and other elites have easy access to, information can be obtained from the Bhoomi kiosk to open up opportunities for them to ‘poach’ on entitlements meant for small farmers, and more important, on their land.





Process
Role of the agent Interface with Bhoomi kiosk
Mutation and khata change for different types of land
To help in mutation process for different types of land. Khata change can be complicated if the parties concerned have not updated and consolidated/ registered land records for years, or have completed only a part of the process. Due to various historical reasons, most small farmers and marginal groups find themselves in such a situation.
Registrar’s office and the kiosk process involve four levels. The agent concerned does not deal with the front office for ‘complicated’ cases, but goes directly to the back office. The agent has contacts with the caseworker, who serves as a centralizing point for the bribes. Bribes are negotiated at one point – the back office.

Bribes vary according to the development of the taluks. In rapidly developing taluks, they are usually Rs.20,000/acre for a khata change. In highly developed taluks, with a rapidly emerging real estate market, the bribes can go upto Rs.40,000/acre.

Agents working for agricultural companies ‘targeting’ farmers.
They specialize in ‘preparing the documentation’ for agricultural schemes. There are two types of agents: a) Agent/employee of a tractor/equipment company, or a fertilizer/seed company; and agent/brokers who deals only with preparing documentation.

Documents required for obtaining loans for agricultural implements or seeds:

(a) Type of farmer

( Tax receipt

© Khata/patta

(d) Encumbrance Certificate

(e) Root or moola document for his land

(f) RTC

(g) Income certificate

(h) No Objection Certificates from local banks

Farmer finds it difficult to hang around in different offices to get these certificates.
The RTC issued by Bhoomi kiosk is only one of the many documents required for companies or farmers to avail any scheme. Various departments issue these documents viz.

(i) Village Accountant;

(j) Thasildar;

(k) Bhoomi kiosk

(l) Revenue Inspector

(m) Sub registrar




“E-Governance” or ‘E-Politics’?

8.30 With fewer constraints of time and space, the tabular categories in Table 8.2 could be expanded into larger and more complex case histories. Yet, even this tabular form provides a sense of how Bhoomi fits into the range of conflicting and congregating interests that land embodies. Thus, to view Bhoomi as an ‘e-governance’ initiative alone is to miss the essential politics involved and the impact of the various roles that government institutions play in land issues.



8.31 In this context, the recollection of an experienced village Panchayat member of the time when Ramakrishna Hegde was Karnataka’s Chief Minister, assumes special significance. This respondent recalls that, at that time, development was more decentralized and moved faster, driven by decision making at the village level. His complaint was that, at present, and despite the constitution of the Gram Panchayats under the 73rd constitutional amendment, the President of the Gram Panchayat has to depend on the Executive Officer and higher levels of government. Scholars too recognize the value of Hegde’s decentralization, where the Mandal, constituted by groups of villages or “hoblis”, moved power down from the taluk level. [41] More important, funds were devolved to this lower level and the Mandal President had powers to shape development programs via a village level consultation process. The point is that most development works are closely linked to the control, management and, indeed, transformation of land. If so, the recording of claims, of taxes, and of a transforming economy, when carried out close to the ground, are best able to reflect these transformations, particularly when recording is an issue reflecting power relationships inherent in land. The dynamics that Table 8.2 shows is one where moving the land management system up to the taluk level can benefit larger players at the cost of those more rooted in local society. This can also cause a fracture in local governance, especially when the stakes in land become larger with the emergence of powerful real estate interests. Here, it is important to note that decentralizing the print-out functions of the RTC as is currently proposed is unlikely to help. An argument that the centralization of land administration is necessary due to the infrastructure requirements required for computerization may be accurate but may result in the ignoring or burying the real distribution of power. What was significant about the Hegde era was the substantive decentralization of developmental powers.



8.32 The GoK has announced, for instance, that RTCs are being made available at the hobli level.[42] Table 8.1 showed that at least in one place where this claim was made, the kiosk was not functional. But it is unclear if the availability of a print out can counteract the diminished role of local bodies in the face of powerful players who use the land management system to their benefit. If powerful groups can influence an administrative system to access records in a manner that benefits them, easy accessibility will work in their favor. One would hardly be surprised if the spatial records miss out strips of marginal land tenure. In relatively more decentralized administrative structures, for instance, smaller farmers are more concerned with the use value of land for immediate farming, and the ‘grayness’ of titles is not as big an issue as is being able to influence local politics in their favor. With the centralizing of land management away from the village level, following the computerizing of records, the Bhoomi project has “efficiently” facilitated the creation of land markets increasingly dominated by large players. While in the Mandal panchayat time small and marginal farmers could hope to influence the system, presently they stand little chance.



8.33 When the ability of the powerful to influence the system is great, other key issues are connected to centralization and computerization. First, to what extent are local and existing tenure arrangements maintained? There is some evidence that, for example, in the process of developing computerized formats, tenure forms have been homogenized to exclude those forms used/occupied by marginal farmers.[43] Second, fieldwork suggests that inherited or land in complex legal categories, when falling under the pada category, is re-classified as sarkari land. Normally, an acquisition process for public projects first identifies public lands, and thus, in this case, will impact small and marginal farmers.



8.34 In both types of taluks almost all the SC/STs and smaller farmers, and a high percentage of the middle level farmers, have their land under pada. Thus, in many ways, the Bhoomi program as a facilitator of land transaction is relevant mostly to those who ‘can transact’. For groups denied the opportunity to officially transact in land, the main interface with the Revenue Department may be to maintain records. But here too our fieldwork suggests that Bhoomi may have opened up land transfers in a way such that lower castes and the poor find themselves at the losing end of a powerful real estate dynamic. A key question is whether new laws, such as the KIDBI (1987), and its amended version of 1998, and the Industrial Township Act of 2003, used increasingly for private sector led development projects, result in the land of the poor and the marginalized being taken over to benefit groups with economic clout.[44]



8.35 This is also related to a third issue: the process of computerization necessarily assumed and digitized titles ‘as they exist’ – given the magnitude of 20 million records. The argument was that if there were errors, the ‘rightful’ claimants would apply for corrections i.e. an iterative process would gradually sort this issue out. But in the context of existing power structures, the misuse of the Bhoomi records by large farmers, and the centralization of records to the taluk level, will this process unintentionally affect the poor and marginal farmers who most often have have ‘un-clear’ and ‘incomplete’ records, and thereby end up assisting a process of appropriation of their lands?



8.36 Bhoomi or any other form of land management must be viewed as more than a techno-managerial solution. Despite having a technically competent and dedicated team led by a committed champion, the political economy of the Bhoomi program often sharpens development divides. This study points to the need to move the discussion on issues of ‘e-governance’ beyond a neutralizing ‘anti-politics’[45]: where interventions are termed as ‘best practice’, politics is neutered as ‘governance’, and complex processes of social and political changes are reduced to a functionalist view of ‘administrative reform’. In adopting a positivist and technocratic view, that analysis would miss out what may be ‘real’ change that is relatively empowering – even if this is uneven, and not intended at all by outstanding administrative reformers.



8.37 In contrast, note, for instance, the interesting grassroots processes underway led by the Panchayati Raj and Rural Development departments of GoK.[46] The approach here is to build administration on substantive issues decided from the GPs upwards: the management of property taxes, the review of development works carried out by line agencies on behalf of GPs, and locally carried out surveys of program beneficiaries. This process draws on, and builds on the experience of the Bellandur Gram Panchayat. In that panchayat, perhaps India’s most ‘IT enabled’, the elected council promoted the first computerization of land records. This was through a program developed by the village body itself and one that integrates land records with a variety of other local management functions. Such a process of transformation has yielded significant revenue increases – three times the previous amount collected.[47] One can see here, that processes of development compete over economic and political terrain. In the case of Bhoomi, it centralizes control to make possibly more efficient forms of revenue extraction – that are, in turn, linked to a particular form of re-structuring land markets. In contrast, we also see the beginnings of a counter political movement towards claiming back political and economic space. Perhaps these ever changing contestations are the way democracies are asserted and built, and at times un-built. If so, then viewing programs like Bhoomi in exclusively managerial terms misses out a larger drama of development.



8.38 Bhoomi and its political economy raise yet other fundamental issues. The financial success of cases like the Bellandur Panchayat, where ‘resource mobilization’ has emerged from political mobilization, could attract the attention of institutions such as the World Bank. An apparent constraint for such international bodies is the ‘politics’: being located at the level of the GP, these efforts signal (more than their mere technical instruments) the increased local control over the investment of capital and, thus, represent a form of political autonomy.[48] The empowerment that accompanies increased control contrasts with the approach of conventional development aid, which promotes reform that ties local government with ‘conditionalities’ that tend to erode local autonomy, and where local groups have little information or influence on decision-making.[49] Looking at the Bhoomi program in the context of the political economy of land is a way of considering the rooting of capital in a locality in a global economy.



8.39 This study suggests that in looking at e-governance dealing with land issues there are conceptual problems in using concepts like ‘transparency’, ‘efficiency’, ‘governance’ and ‘best practice’. Since most ‘e-governance’ projects are forms of interventions into an un-even terrain of power and control, there is a need to move beyond the view that technology always emancipates, de-linked and somehow placed above society and its political economy, even as we seek to replicate projects such as Bhoomi.



Future research and its settings

8.40 This research can be extended along many lines. It could for instance, focus on the technical systems, or on the training of the personnel involved, or the financial costing of these efforts. All these are certainly valuable. But given the economic and political significance of modifying land-recording systems, further research should also emphasize the political economy of land records systems rather than focus exclusively on the techno-managerial systems. It would be useful to extend this analysis of political economy into the five pre-independence governance regions of Karnataka that Bhoomi includes, and with that a closer study of customary forms of governance and their land management systems. Of particular interest are the northern districts of the states, with their severe rural poverty, and those parts of the state slated for development with mega projects. It would also be useful to relate the efforts of the Panchayati Raj and Rural Development department to the impact of the Bhoomi program. Studying the Bellandur Panchayat, which has developed its own version (and a fore-runner) of the Bhoomi, will be yet another useful project.



8.41 There are also methodological issues raised by this study. It shows how the study of topics related to societal fractures demand a mix of qualitative method and strategic surveys. Qualitative methods are critical to generate hypotheses that define the categories of analysis by exposing the terrain of power relationships and, thus, provide a sharper analysis of political economy. Qualitative methods can identify the issues to be further tested by survey methods, and help define the parameters of sampling.



8.42 Ethnographic analyses, like this study, call for a particular structure of the research team and research process. In much research, researchers locate themselves in an intellectual ‘high ground’,[50] placed in centrally located, well-furbished institutions to process data and develop arguments generated by survey data from ‘foot soldiers’. In contrast to investments on infrastructure of the high ground, and substantial sums spent on post-research dissemination of findings via conferences (as opposed to dissemination to the to the groups surveyed and researched upon, on